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Abstract
The notion of Net Present Value (NPV) is thought to formally translate the notion of
economic profit, where the discount rate is the cost of capital. The latter is the expected
rate of return of an equivalent-risk alternative that the investor might undertake and is often
found by making recourse to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This paper shows that the
notions of disequilibrium NPV and economic profit are not equivalent: NPV-minded agents
are open to framing effects and to arbitrage losses, which imply violations of Modigliani and
Miller’s Proposition I. The notion of disequilibrium (present) value, deductively derived from
the CAPM by several authors and widely used in applied corporate finance, should therefore
be dismissed.
Keywords. Capital Asset Pricing Model, Net Present Value, Economic profit, disequilibrium,
framing effects, arbitrage, Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I.
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1 Introduction
Economic profit on one side, (net) present value on the other side. The former is one of the
building blocks of economic theory, the latter is a cornerstone in financial economics.
Economic profit is a fundamental notion in economic theory since Marshall (1890). It repre-
sents the “excess profit that is gained from an investment over and above the profit that could
be obtained from the best alternative foregone” (Rao, 1992, p. 87). That is, economic profit
from an investment is the difference between profit from that investment and profit from the
best alternative foregone. In other terms, the alternative foregone’s profit acts as an opportunity
cost (see Buchanan, 1969). As known, many synonyms have been coined to mean ‘economic
profit’: ‘excess profit’ (Preinreich, 1938), ‘excess realizable profit’ (Edwards and Bell, 1961), ‘ex-
cess income’ (Kay, 1976), ‘abnormal earnings’ (Peasnell, 1981), ‘supernormal profit’ (see Begg,
Fischer, and Dornbusch, 1984, p. 121), ‘residual income’ (Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace, 1999).
The concept of ‘Goodwill’ (e.g., Preinreich, 1936) is also strictly related to that of excess profit.
Other names are Economic Value Added, Cash Value Added, Shareholders Value Creation (see
Ferna´ndez, 2002).1.
1See Magni, 2000a, 2000b,2003, for a nonclassical way of formalizing economic profit.
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Net Present Value (NPV) is a fundamental notion in finance since Fisher (1930), although
“the technology of discounting is not an invention of twentieth century” (Miller and Napier, 1993,
p. 640): Discounted-cash-flow analysis was known and (sometimes) employed since eighteenth
century (Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd, 2001. See also Parker, 1968; Edwards and
Warman, 1981). As known, the NPV is a function of the discount rate, and the latter is
often found by making use of the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964;
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), which puts into effect the NPV methodology.
The notions of economic profit and NPV are often viewed as two sides of the same medal:
The NPV is just economic profit disguised in present terms. The common idea of economic
profit maximization is then equivalent to the idea of net present value maximization: “The firm
attempts to maximize the present value of its net cash flow over an infinite horizon” (Abel, 1990,
p. 755) and “the net present value rule is also the basis for the neoclassical theory of investment”
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 5).
Decision making is straightforward with such equivalent notions. Rubinstein (1973) shows
that if the CAPM assumptions are met, a project is worth undertaking if its expected rate of
return is greater than the disequilibrium required rate of return. His maximization rule is as
follows:
The firm should accept the project with the highest excess expected internal rate of
return weighted by its cost (p. 174)
This result . . . is equivalent to accepting the project with the highest net present
value (ibidem, footnote 14).
The first quotation just focuses on maximization of economic profit, the second one suggests
to maximize net present value. Magni (2007a) shows that the use of disequilibrium values is
standard in corporate finance and is widespread in academic papers as well as in textbooks.
This paper shows that, contrary to what Rubinstein seems to imply, the alleged equivalence
of (disequilibrium) NPV and economic profit does not hold. Such a NPV does not represent
economic profit and, in addition, it is a biased measure because it is nonadditive; the same holds
for the notion of disequilibrium value.2 In particular, decision makers abiding by the standard
NPV+CAPM methodology give inconsistent answers to the same problem differently framed.
In other terms, they are trapped in a sort of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) so that
their evaluations differ depending on whether outcomes are seen as aggregate or disaggregate
2Problems in the equilibrium NPV may be found by Magni (2007a, 2007b as well).
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quantities. This amounts to saying that their valuations and choice behaviors do not comply with
the principle of description invariance, which prescribes that valuations and decisions must be
invariant under changes in description of the same asset. Violations of this principle are known
as framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Soman, 2004).
This bias bears significant relations to the violation of the principle of arbitrage, which is a well-
established principle of economic rationality implying that rational decision makers do not incur
arbitrage losses (see Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). In the field of corporate valuation
this violation reduces to an infringement of the classical Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 it is shown that NPV and economic profit
bear a strong formal relation in that the former is the present value of the latter. Section 3
shows an example highlighting the fact that NPV does not represent economic profit, is not
additive and does not fulfill the principle of description invariance (i.e. implies framing effects).
In contrast, economic profit is additive and frame-independent. Section 4 shows the same results
in more formal terms. In section 5 it is shown, on the basis of the previous results, that value
itself is nonadditive. Section 6 shows that NPV-minded decision makers incur arbitrage losses.
Section 7 shows that the association of CAPM and NPV does not comply with Modigliani and
Miller’s Proposition I. In particular, the choice behavior of a potential NPV-minded buyer is
not invariant under changes in the firm debt-equity ratio.
2 Economic profit and NPV as companions
Let W 0 be an investment cost and denote with W 1 the final payoff at time 1. Consider the
profit W 1 −W 0, which we can reformulate as rW 0, with r = W 1−W 0
W 0
being the rate of return.
Consider also an alternative business for the investor and let i be the relative rate of return.
The corresponding profit is W 0(1 + i) − W 0 = iW 0 and represents an opportunity cost, a
foregone return. The economic (excess) profit is given by the difference between the factual
profit the entrepreneur receives and the counterfactual profit she would receive if she invested
in the alternative business. Denoting economic profit with pi we have:
pi = rW 0 − iW 0. (1)
Note that the above equation may also be stated as a difference between two future values:
pi = W 1 −W 0(1 + i). (2)
From a financial perspective, pi is the Net Future Value. In finance, it is common to work with
present values so the notion of Net Present Value (NPV) is introduced, which is given by the
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discounted algebraic sum of all cash flows involved in the business. In our simplified one-period
case, we have
NPV = −W 0 + W
1
1 + i
. (3)
Economic profit and NPV bear a strong formal relation: NPV is the present value of (1) (or,
equivalently, the present value of (2)):
NPV =
pi
1 + i
=
1
1 + i
(rW 0 − iW 0). (4)
In other terms, economic profit and net future value are different names for the same notion,
whereas net present value is the present value of economic profit. It is worthwhile noting that
eqs. (3)-(4) preserve the sign of eqs. (1)-(2) (as long as i > −1, as will be assumed here).
Decision-making implications of this formal equivalence are straightforward: A business is worth
undertaking if and only if the economic profit (the NPV) is positive.
Under uncertainty, the rates r and i are expected values and the two rates refer to alternatives
equivalent in risk, so that eqs. (1) and (3) are measures of expected excess profit (in final and
present terms respectively). What ‘equivalent in risk’ means depends on the model selected.
The classical and sophisticated CAPM is the most common tool for measuring an asset’s risk,
which is given by its beta:
β =
cov(r˜, r˜m)
σ2m
=
cov(W˜ 1, rm)
W 0σ2m
(5)
where r˜m and σ2m denotes the market rate of return and its variance (a tilde on a symbol will
henceforth highlight randomness).
To calculate excess profit (and NPV) under uncertainty one just has to use the fundamental
equation of the CAPM, known as the Security Market Line (SML). Under suitable assumptions,
the latter individuates the required rate of return of the business under examination; such a
rate is the (opportunity) cost of capital, i.e. the expected rate of return of the counterfactual
alternative available to the entrepreneur. We have
i = rf + β(rm − rf ) (6)
where rf is the risk-free rate and rm is the expected market rate of return. Applying this security
valuation relation to capital budgeting we have a simple rule: A project should be undertaken
if and only if
r > rf + β(rm − rf ) (7)
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i.e. if and only if its expected rate of return exceeds the cost of capital (see Rubinstein, 1973,
p. 171) or, in terms of NPV, if and only if its risk-adjusted NPV is positive:
−W 0 + W
1
1 + rf + β(rm − rf ) > 0 (8)
where W 1 is the expected value of W˜ 1.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that the beta in (5) is a disequilibrium beta, so that the NPV
in (8) is a disequilibrium NPV. Beside Rubinstein (1973), the legitimacy of the disequilibrium
beta has been deducted from the CAPM by several authors (see Senbet and Thompson, 1978;
Magni, 2007c, for a review).
3 Nonadditivity and framing effects: An example
Consider the security market described in Table 1, where a risky asset and a risk-free asset
are traded and two possible states may occur, conventionally labeled ‘good’ and ‘bad’, with
probability 0.8 and 0.2 respectively. The market is complete, is assumed to be in equilibrium
(all marketed assets lie on the SML) and arbitrage is not possible.3 Let us imagine an economic
agent comes across the opportunity of investing in a business A composed of two sub-projects.
The first one, say A1, consists of an outlay of 15500 euros and generates an outcome of W˜ 1A,
equal to 58000 in good state and 3000 in bad state. The second one, say A2, consists in an
outflow of 70000 euros and a final risk-free inflow of 72000 at time 1. Suppose also that this
two-project business is to be fully accepted or fully rejected (no sub-project may be undertaken
alone). To decide, the investor computes the NPV of the business. The rates of return of A1 are
58000/15500−1=2.7419 and 3000/15500−1=−0.8064 in good and bad state respectively; the
expected rate of return is rA1 = (2.7419)(0.8) + (−0.8064)(0.2) = 2.0322. The covariance of r˜A1
with r˜m is cov(r˜A1 , r˜m) = 0.5677 and the risk is therefore βA1=0.5677/0.16=3.5484. The cost
of capital is iA1=rf + βA1(rm − rf ) = 0.15 + 3.5484(0.45− 0.15) = 1.2145. The economic profit
is then
W 0A1(rA1 − iA1) = 15500(2.0322− 1.2145) = 12675 (9)
while the NPV is
NPVA1 =
12675
1 + iA1
=
12675
1 + 1.2145
= 5723. (10)
3As Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show, if (i) the CAPM pricing relation holds for all securities in the market,
(ii) the market is complete, (iii) the probability that r˜m > rm +
σ2m
rm−rf is positive, then arbitrage opportunities
arise. But in our market of Table 1 condition (iii) is not satisfied.
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As for A2, its rate of return is 0.02857=72/70−1 in both states. As the project is riskless, the
cost of capital is rf = 0.15, so the excess profit is
W 0A2(rA2 − rf ) = 70000(0.0285− 0.15) = −8500 (11)
and the NPV is
NPVA2 =
−8500
1 + rf
=
−8500
1 + 0.15
= −7391. (12)
Consider now a business B that can be undertaken with an expenditure of 85500 euros whereby
the investor will obtain W˜ 1B, equal to 130000 or 75000 in good and bad state respectively. The
rate of return of B is 130000/85500−1=0.5204 and 75000/85500−1=−0.1228 in good and bad
state respectively so that the expected rate of return is rB=(0.8)0.5204+(0.2)(−0.1228)=0.39181.
It is easy to see that the risk of B is βB=0.6432 and the cost of capital is therefore iB =
0.15 + 0.6432(0.45− 0.15)=0.34298. The excess profit is
W 0B(rB − iB) = 85500(0.39181− 0.34298) = 4175 (13)
and the NPV is
NPVB =
4175
1 + iB
=
4175
1 + 0.34298
= 3108. (14)
It is worthwhile noting that the NPV of business B differs from the NPV of business A, which is
5723−7391=−1668. Yet, the two businesses represent the same course of action described in two
different ways, because both share the same total investment outlay (15500+75000=85500) and
the same final outcomes in good and bad state (58000+72000=130000 and 3000+72000=75000).
We have thenA1+A2=B. This is a significant result. From a financial perspectives, it means that
the NPV is nonadditive (because NPVA1+NPVA2 6=NPVA1+A2); from a cognitive and behavioral
outlook, it means that an NPV-minded economic agent incurs framing effects in decision making,
because the alternative A1 + A2 is rejected (its NPV is negative) and the logically equivalent
alternative B is accepted (its NPV is positive). By contrast, note that the economic profit as
translated in (1) gives univocal results: Economic profit from B is 4175, which coincides with
economic profit from the two-project business A (=12675− 8500).
4 Nonadditivity and framing effects: A simple formalization
In general, consider an investment whose initial outlay is W 0 and whose final payoff is the
random sum W˜ 1, available at time 1. This investment may always be seen as a portfolio of two
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investments, one risky and one risk-free, whose outlays are W 0−h and h respectively and whose
outcomes are W˜ 1 − k and k respectively, with h, k ∈ R. The economic profit of the investment
may be formalized as the sum of these two investments’ excess profits. In order to avoid framing
effects, description invariance must be guaranteed, which means that economic profit must be
invariant under changes in h and k. Indeed, considering pi and i as functions of h and k, we
have
pi(h, k) =
risky excess profit︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(W 1 − k)− (W 0 − h)− i(h, k)(W 0 − h)]+ risk-free excess profit︷ ︸︸ ︷(k − h− rfh) (15)
with
i(h, k) = rf +
rm − rf
σ2m
cov
(W˜ 1 − k
W 0 − h − 1, r˜m
)
.
Substituting the latter in (15) we obtain
pi(h, k) = W 1 −W 0 − [rf + rm − rf
σ2m
cov
(W˜ 1 − k
W 0 − h − 1, r˜m
)]
(W 0 − h)− rfh
= W 1 −W 0 −
[
rf +
rm − rf
(W 0 − h)σ2m
cov(W˜ 1, r˜m)
]
(W 0 − h)− rfh
= W 1 −W 0(1 + rf )− rm − rf
σ2m
cov
(
W˜ 1, rm
)
.
It is then evident that ∂pi(h,k)∂h =
∂pi(h,k)
∂k = 0 for all h and k, which means that economic profit
does not change whatever the way the investment is partitioned (i.e., regardless of aggregation
or disaggregation of cash flows).
As for the NPV, seen as a function of h and k, things are different:
NPV(h, k) = −(W 0 − h) + W
1 − k
1 + rf +
rm−rf
σ2m
cov( W˜ 1−k
W 0−h − 1, r˜m)
+
[
−h+ k
1 + rf
]
(16)
whence
NPV(h, k) = −W 0 + W
1 − k
1 + rf +
rm−rf
σ2m
(
W 0−h
) cov(W˜ 1, r˜m) + k1 + rf . (17)
It is evident that, in general, ∂NPV(h,k)∂h 6= 0 as well as ∂NPV(h,k)∂k 6= 0. Therefore NPV changes as
h and/or k change, and it is not true that NPV(h1, k1)=NPV(h2, k2) for all h1, h2, k1, k2, as the
principle of description invariance requires. As a particular case, the example above described
has shown that
pi(70000, 72000) = pi(0, 0) = 4175
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whereas
NPV(70000, 72000) = −1668 6= NPV(0, 0) = 3108;
in the latter case choice behavior depends on the choice of the pair (h, k), in the former case it
is irrelevant.
5 Value is nonadditive
As a consequence, the notion of value in this context is severely undermined. The value V of an
asset is given by V=NPV+W 0 (where W 0 is the cost to be paid by investors for undertaking it).
Referring to the numerical example above where B=A1 +A2 and bearing in mind the previous
results about NPV, we have
VA1 + VA2 = NPVA1 +W
0
A1 + NPVA2 +W
0
A2
= NPVA1 + NPVA2 +W
0
B
6= NPVB +W 0B = VB = VA1+A2 .
with obvious meaning of W 0A1 , W
0
A2
, W 0B. Putting it differently, value is a function of h and k:
V (h, k) = NPV(h, k) +W 0 (18)
whose partial derivatives are not identically zero (see eq. (17)), and thus value is not invariant
under changes in the description of valuation process.
6 Arbitrage Losses
The nonadditivity of value and net present value is full of implications. In addition to the
framing effect above mentioned we have that our NPV-minded investor is subject to arbitrage
losses. To see why, let us refer to the example in section 3. Suppose an economic agent (whom
we can call the arbitrageur) asks the investor for a borrowing of 89000 euros whereby he will
repay the amount W˜ 1B after one period (the investor accepts to lend money, given that the
NPV is easily found to be 112.326). At the same time, the arbitrageur offers our investor two
financings: A loan of 15500 whereby the investor will repay W˜ 1A1 and a loan of 70000 whereby
the investor will reimbursed 72000 euros at the end of the period. These financings are to be
accepted or rejected conjunctly. Our investor evidently accepts, given that −(NPVA1+NPVA2)
is positive (=1668). As a result of this choice behavior, our NPV-minded investor receives a
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sure loss of 3500 euros, whereas the arbitrageur receives a sure gain of 4000. (Table 2 shows the
NPV-minded investor’s payoffs. Those for the arbitrageur are the same with opposite sign).
7 Violation of Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I
Let us now focus on a world a` la Modigliani and Miller (1958) where Proposition I holds, so
that firm value is not affected by the mix equity-debt. Consider an example of two firms. Firm
U is unlevered and all the stocks are owned by entrepreneur U; firm L is levered and all the
stocks and bonds are owned by agent L.4 Let P be a potential buyer and suppose that:
• the two firms will generate the same total cash flow W˜ 1
• agent U is ready to sell his stocks in exchange of W 0 euros
• agent L is ready to sell his entire endowment in firm L selling the stocks in exchange of
W 0 euros but giving free his bonds to the buyer of the firm
• the debt of firm L is risk-free
• agent P is a CAPM enthusiast and selects alternatives via NPV rule.
As a result of the above assumptions, investor P computes the value of both firms as follows.
The value of firm U is5
VU =
W 1
kU
(19)
where kU = rf + βU (rf − rm) is the (unlevered) cost of capital. Denoting with r˜U the rate of
return for firm U’s stockholders, the unlevered beta is given by
βU =
cov(r˜U , r˜m)
σ2m
. (20)
As firm U is sold at W0 and will generate payoff W˜1, the rate of return for the buyer is r˜U =
W˜ 1
W 0
− 1, (20) becomes
βU =
cov(W˜
1
W 0
− 1, r˜m)
σ2m
=
cov(W˜ 1, r˜m)
W 0σ2m
. (21)
4Agents U and L are therefore representative agents (for sake of simplicity) but one may equivalently consider
agents holding only some shares and bonds in a convenient ratio.
5The relations presented in this section may be interpreted in two ways: Perpetuity of constant cash flows may
be assumed, as usual, or (for coherence with the above sections) one may think of a one-period firm so that W˜ 1
is the final free cash flow, the rates rf , rm, kU , ke are capitalization factors (i.e. 1 plus rate), and I represents
interest+principal repayment.
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The value of firm L is easily found. Denoting with I the cash flow to debt, the equity cash flow
is W˜ 1 − I. Bearing in mind that the cost of debt equals the risk-free rate we have
VL =
W 1 − I
ke
+
I
rf
(22)
where ke = rf + βe(rf − rm). Denoting with r˜e the rate of return for firm L’s stockholders, the
beta of equity is given by
βe =
cov(r˜e, r˜m)
σ2m
. (23)
As equity is sold at W0, the rate of return is r˜e =
W˜ 1 − I
W 0
− 1, so that (23) becomes
βe =
cov(W˜
1−I
W 0
− 1, r˜m)
σ2m
=
cov(W˜ 1 − I, r˜m)
W 0σ2m
. (24)
But cov(W˜ 1 − I, r˜m)=cov(W˜ 1, r˜m) for I is a real number. Consequently we have
βe =
cov(W˜ 1, r˜m)
W 0σ2m
= βU (25)
which implies
ke = rf + βe(rf − rm) = rf + βU (rf − rm) = kU (26)
whence
VL =
W 1 − I
kU
+
I
rf
=
W 1
kU
− I
kU
+
I
rf
6= W
1
kU
= VU .
This result contradicts Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. This just means what we already
know: Valuation is not invariant under changes in framing. In this case, we have two financially
equivalent firms paying off the same total cash flows. Viewing the latter either as an aggregate
quantity or as the sum of two quantities of different nature makes valuation nonequivalent.6
Analogously, choice behavior may differ. Whenever agent P finds that
NPVL = VL −W 0 < 0 < VU −W 0 = NPVU
then firm U is purchased and firm L is not. In the opposite case
NPVU = VU −W 0 < 0 < VL −W 0 = NPVL
6We have assumed that agent L gives free his holdings of bonds. This is not restrictive, as the numerical
example in section 3 shows: Assume A1’s cash flow is the equity cash flow of a levered firm, A2’s cash flow is
the cash flow to debt, A1 and A2’s outlays are just the price at which agent L is ready to sell equity and bonds
respectively; suppose also B’s cash flow is the capital cash flow of an unlevered firm and B’s outlay is the price
at which agent U is ready to sell the firm. Then, the values of the two firms differ, as seen.
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it is firm L to be purchased.7 Again, this is a bias in the behavior of our NPV enthusiast.
In contrast, economic profit leads to a correct decision: Economic profit from U is
(W 1 −W 0)− kUW 0,
economic profit from L is[((
W 1 − I)−W 0)− keW 0]+ [(I − 0)− (rf0)]
which are equal since ke = kU , as shown in (26).
8 Conclusions
The Net Present Value (NPV) of an investment is usually thought to represent economic profit.
In applied corporate finance, a widespread way to value an asset (and thus to compute an NPV)
is to discount cash flows with a disequilibrium cost of capital calculated via CAPM (for the use
of an equilibrium NPV see Magni, 2007a, 2007b). The (disequilibrium) NPV of an investment
is formally given by the present value of excess profit (value is then computed as the present
value of excess profit plus cost). The disequilibrium NPV is validly deducted from the CAPM,
as Rubinstein (1973) shows. However this paper, focusing on such a disequilibrium NPV shows
that:
• while it is true that this NPV is calculated by discounting economic profit (and value is
found by adding cost), it does not represent economic profit
• the disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive, which also implies that the disequilibrium value is
nonadditive
• NPV-minded decision makers incur framing effects in both valuation (different values and
NPVs) and choice behavior (accepting and rejecting the same investment)
• NPV-minded agents are open to arbitrage losses
• the standard disequilibrium NPV+CAPM valuation procedure is not consistent with Modigliani
and Miller’s Proposition I.
7Obviously, in this case agent P becomes, at the same time, stockholder and bondholder.
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Consequently, the association of disequilibrium NPV and CAPM is a flawed methodology and
should not be used for project valuation and selection, given that it does not fulfill the principle
of description invariance (valuation and judgment must not depend on framing) and the principle
of arbitrage (rational decision makers do not incur arbitrage losses).
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Table 1. The security market
Security
risky risk-free Market
Outstanding shares 10 10
state probability
165 115 1,650 s1 0.8
Cash Flow
{
65 115 650 s2 0.2
65 15 65 s1 0.8
Rate of return (%)
{
−35 15 −35 s2 0.2
Expected
rate of return (%)
45 15 45
Covariance with
the market rate of return
0.16 0 0.16
Beta 1 0 1
Value 100 100 1000
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Table 2. Arbitrage loss for an NPV-minded agent
Payoffs
Time 0 Time 1
Borrowing (=−A1) 15500 −W˜ 1A1
Borrowing (=−A2) 70000 −72000
Lending −89000 W˜ 1B
Net Payoffs −3500 W˜ 1B−W˜ 1A1−72000=0
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